Chapter 11. Case Studies
In this chapter we'll delve deeply into some advanced topics: complex port forwarding, integration of SSH with other applications, and more. Some interesting features of SSH don't come to the surface unless examined closely, so we hope you get a lot out of these case studies. Roll up your sleeves, dive in, and have fun.
Contents:Unattended SSH: Batch or cron Jobs
Pine, IMAP, and SSH
Kerberos and SSH
Connecting Through a GatewayHost
11.1. Unattended SSH: Batch or cron JobsSSH isn't only a great interactive tool but also a resource for automation. Batch scripts, cron jobs, and other automated tasks can benefit from the security provided by SSH, but only if implemented properly. The major challenge is authentication: how can a client prove its identity when no human is available to type a password or passphrase? (We'll just write "password" from now on to mean both.) You must carefully select an authentication method, and then equally carefully make it work. Once this infrastructure is established, you must invoke ssh properly to avoid prompting the user. In this case study, we discuss the pros and cons of different authentication methods for operating an SSH client unattended. Note that any kind of unattended authentication presents a security problem and requires compromise, and SSH is no exception. Without a human present when needed to provide credentials (type a password, provide a thumbprint, etc.), those credentials must be stored persistently somewhere on the host system. Therefore, an attacker who compromises the system badly enough can use those credentials to impersonate the program and gain whatever access it has. Selecting a technique is a matter of understanding the pros and cons of the available methods, and picking your preferred poison. If you can't live with this fact, you shouldn't expect strong security of unattended remote jobs.
11.1.1. Password AuthenticationRule number 1: forget password authentication if you care about the security of your batch jobs. In order to use password authentication, you must embed the password within the batch script or put it in a file which the script reads, etc. Whatever you do, the location of the password will be obvious to anyone reading the script. We don't recommend this technique; the public-key methods coming up are more secure.
11.1.2. Public-Key AuthenticationIn public-key authentication, a private key is the client's credentials. Therefore the batch job needs access to the key, which must be stored where the job can access it. You have three choices of location for the key, which we discuss separately:
126.96.36.199. Storing the passphrase in the filesystemIn this technique, you store an encrypted key and its passphrase in the filesystem so a script can access them. We don't recommend this method, since you can store an unencrypted key in the filesystem with the same level of security (and considerably less complication). In either case, you rely solely on the filesystem's protections to keep the key secure. This observation is the rationale for the next technique.
188.8.131.52. Using a plaintext keyA plaintext or unencrypted key requires no passphrase. To create one, run ssh-keygen and simply press the Return key when prompted for a passphrase (or similarly, remove the passphrase from an existing key using ssh-keygen -p). You can then supply the key filename on the ssh command line using the -i option, or in the client configuration file with the IdentityFile keyword. [Section 7.4.2, "User Identity"] Usually plaintext keys are undesirable, equivalent to leaving your password in a file in your account. They are never a good idea for interactive logins, since the SSH agent provides the same benefits in a much more secure fashion. But a plaintext key is a viable option for automation, since the unattended aspect forces us to rely on some kind of persistent state in the machine. The filesystem is one possibility. Given that the situations of a plaintext key, encrypted key with stored passphrase, and stored password are in a sense all equivalent, there are still three reasons to prefer the plaintext key method:
184.108.40.206. Using an agentThe ssh-agent provides another, somewhat less vulnerable method of key storage for batch jobs. A human invokes an agent and loads the needed keys from passphrase-protected key files, just once. Thereafter, unattended jobs use this long-running agent for authentication. In this case, the keys are still in plaintext but within the memory space of the running agent rather than in a file on disk. As a matter of practical cracking, it is more difficult to extract a data structure from the address space of a running process than to gain illicit access to a file. Also, this solution avoids the problem of an intruder's walking off with a backup tape containing the plaintext key. Security can still be compromised by overriding filesystem permissions, though. The agent provides access to its services via a Unix-domain socket, which appears as a node in the filesystem. Anyone who can read and write that socket can instruct the agent to sign authentication requests and thus gain use of the keys. But this compromise isn't quite so devastating since the attacker can't get the keys themselves through the agent socket. She merely gains use of the keys for as long as the agent is running and as long as she can maintain her compromise of the host. The agent method does have a down side: the system can't continue unattended after a reboot. When the host comes up again automatically, the batch jobs won't have their keys until someone shows up to restart the agent and provide the passphrases to load the keys. This is just a cost of the improved security, and you have a pager, right? Another bit of complication with the agent method is that you must arrange for the batch jobs to find the agent. SSH clients locate an agent via an environment variable pointing to the agent socket, such as SSH_AUTH_SOCK for the SSH1 and OpenSSH agents. [Section 220.127.116.11, "Single-shell method"] When you start the agent for batch jobs, you need to record its output where the jobs can find it. For instance, if the job is a shell script, you can store the environment values in a file:
You can add keys to the agent (assuming C shell syntax here):$ ssh-agent | head -2 > ~/agent-info $ cat ~/agent-info setenv SSH_AUTH_SOCK /tmp/ssh-res/ssh-12327-agent; setenv SSH_AGENT_PID 12328;
then instrument any scripts to set the same values for the environment variables:$ source ~/agent-info $ ssh-add batch-key Need passphrase for batch-key (batch job SSH key). Enter passphrase: **************
You also need to ensure that the batch jobs (and nobody else!) can read and write the socket. If there's only one uid using the agent, the simplest thing to do is start the agent under that uid (e.g., as root, do su <batch_account> ssh-agent ...). If multiple uids are using the agent, you must adjust the permissions on the socket and its containing directory so that these uids can all access it, perhaps using group permissions.#!/bin/csh # Source the agent-info file to get access to our ssh-agent. set agent = ~/agent-info if (-r $agent) then source $agent else echo "Can't find or read agent file; exiting." exit 1 endif # Now use SSH for something... ssh -q -o 'BatchMode yes' user@remote-server my-job-command
TIP: Some operating systems behave oddly with respect to permissions on Unix-domain sockets. Some versions of Solaris, for example, completely ignore the modes on a socket, allowing any process at all full access to it. To protect a socket in such situations, set the containing directory to forbid access. For example, if the containing directory is mode 700, only the directory owner may access the socket. (This assumes there's no other shortcut to the socket located elsewhere, such as a hard link.)Using an agent for automation is more complicated and restrictive than using a plaintext key; however, it is more resistant to attack and doesn't leave the key on disk and tape where it can be stolen. Considering that the agent is still vulnerable to being misused via the filesystem, and that it is intended to run indefinitely, the advantages of this method are debatable. Still, we recommend the agent method as the most secure and flexible strategy for automated SSH usage in a security-conscious environment.
11.1.3. Trusted-Host AuthenticationIf security concerns are relatively light, consider trusted-host authentication for batch jobs. In this case, the "credentials" are the operating system's notion of a process's uid: the identity under which a process is running, which determines what rights it has over protected objects. An attacker need only manage to get control of a process running under your uid, to impersonate you to a remote SSH server. If he breaks root on the client, this is particularly simple, since root may create processes under any uid. The real crux, though, is the client host key: if the attacker gets that, he can sign bogus authentication requests presenting himself as any user at all, and sshd will believe them. Trusted-host authentication is in many ways the least secure SSH authentication method. [Section 18.104.22.168, "Trusted-host authentication (Rhosts and RhostsRSA)"] It leaves systems vulnerable to transitive compromise: if an attacker gains access to an account on host H, she immediately has access to the same account on all machines that trust H, with no further effort. Also, trusted-host configuration is limited, fragile, and easy to get wrong. Public-key authentication affords both greater security and flexibility, particularly since you can restrict the commands that may be invoked and the client hosts that may connect, using its forced commands and other options in the authorization file.
11.1.4. KerberosKerberos-5 [Section 11.4, "Kerberos and SSH"] contains support for long-running jobs in the form of renewable tickets. While there's no explicit support for these in SSH, a batch job can be designed to use them. As with agent usage, a human performs an initial kinit to get a TGT for the batch account, using the -r switch to request a renewable ticket. Periodically, the batch job uses kinit -R to renew the TGT before it expires. This can be repeated up to the maximum renewable lifetime of the ticket, typically a few days. Like trusted-host authentication, however, SSH Kerberos support lacks the close authorization controls provided by the public-key options. Even in an installation using Kerberos for user authentication, it's probably best to use some form of public-key authentication for unattended jobs instead. For more information on renewable tickets, see the Kerberos-5 documentation.
11.1.5. General Precautions for Batch JobsRegardless of the method you choose, some extra precautions will help secure your environment.
22.214.171.124. Least-privilege accountsThe account under which the automated job runs should have only those privileges needed to run the job, and no more. Don't run every batch job as root just because it's convenient. Arrange your filesystem and other protections so the job can run as a less privileged user. Remember that unattended remote jobs increase the risk of account compromise, so take the extra trouble to avoid the root account whenever possible.
126.96.36.199. Separate, locked-down automation accountsCreate accounts that are used solely for automation. Try not to run system batch jobs in a user account, since you might not be able to reduce its privileges to the small set necessary to support the job. In many cases, an automation account doesn't even need to admit interactive logins. If jobs running under its uid are created directly by the batch job manager (e.g., cron), the account doesn't need a password and should be locked.
188.8.131.52. Restricted-use keysAs much as possible, restrict the target account to perform only the work needed for the job. With public-key authentication, automated jobs should use keys that aren't shared by interactive logins. Imagine that someday you might need to eliminate the key for security reasons, and you don't want to affect other users or jobs by this change. For maximum control, use a separate key for each automated task. Additionally, place all possible restrictions on the key by setting options in the authorization file. [Section 8.2, "Public Key-Based Configuration "] The command option restricts the key to running only the needed remote command, and the from option restricts usage to appropriate client hosts. Consider always adding the following options as well, if they don't interfere with the job:
These make it harder to misuse the key should it be stolen. If you're using trusted-host authentication, these restrictions aren't available. In this case, it's best to use a special shell for the account, which limits the commands that may be executed. Since sshd uses the target account's shell to run any commands on the user's behalf, this is an effective restriction. One standard tool is the Unix "restricted shell." Confusingly, the restricted shell is usually named "rsh", but has nothing to do with the Berkeley r-command for opening a remote shell, rsh.no-port-forwarding,no-X11-forwarding,no-agent-forwarding,no-pty
184.108.40.206. Useful ssh optionsWhen running SSH commands in a batch job, it's a good idea to use these options:
The -q option is for quiet mode, preventing SSH from printing a variety of warnings. This is sometimes necessary if you're using SSH as a pipe from one program to another. Otherwise, the SSH warnings may be interpreted as remote program output and confuse the local program. [Section 7.4.15, "Logging and Debugging"] The BatchMode keyword tells SSH not to prompt the user, who in this case doesn't exist. This makes error reporting more straightforward, eliminating some confusing SSH messages about failing to access a tty. [Section 220.127.116.11, "Batch mode: suppressing prompts"]ssh -q -o 'BatchMode yes'
11.1.6. RecommendationsOur recommended method for best security with unattended SSH operation is public-key authentication with keys stored in an agent. If that isn't feasible, trusted-host or plaintext-key authentication may be used instead; your local security concerns and needs will determine which is preferable, using the foregoing discussion as a guideline. To the extent possible, use separate accounts and keys for each job. By doing so, you limit the damage caused by compromising any one account, or stealing any one key. But of course, there is a complexity trade-off here; if you have a hundred batch jobs, separate accounts or keys for each one may be too much to deal with. In that case, partition the jobs into categories according to the privileges they need, and use a separate account and/or key for each category of job. You can ease the burden of multiple keys by applying a little automation to the business of loading them. The keys can all be stored under the same passphrase: a script prompts for the passphrase, then runs ssh-add multiple times to add the various keys. Or they have different passphrases, and the human inserts a diskette containing the passphrases when loading them. Perhaps the passphrase list itself is encrypted under a single password provided by the human. For that matter, the keys themselves can be kept on the key diskette and not stored on the filesystem at all: whatever fits your needs and paranoia level.
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