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Existing users must be added to the "wheel" group by hand. This is done for security reasons, and you should be cautious with whom you give access to. On OpenBSD, users who are in the wheel group are allowed to use the su(1) userland program to become root. Users who are not in "wheel" cannot use su(1). Here is an example of a /etc/group entry to place the user ericj into the "wheel" group.
If you are adding a new user with adduser(8), you can put them in the wheel group by answering wheel at "Invite user into other groups:". This will add them to /etc/group, which will look something like this:
If you are looking for a way to allow users limited access to superuser privileges without putting them in the "wheel" group, use sudo(8).
To duplicate your filesystem use dump(8) and restore(8). For example, to duplicate everything under directory SRC to directory DST, do a:
# cd /SRC; dump 0f - . | (cd /DST; restore -rf - )
dump is designed to give you plenty of backup capabilities, and it may be an overkill if you just want to duplicate a part of a (or an entire) filesystem. The command tar(1) may be faster for this operation. The format looks very similar:
# cd /SRC; tar cf - . | (cd /DST; tar xpf - )
OpenBSD uses an rc(8) style startup. This uses a few key files for startup.
The main files a system administrator should concentrate on are /etc/rc.conf (or /etc/rc.conf.local), /etc/rc.local and /etc/rc.shutdown. To get a look of how the rc(8) procedure works, here is the flow:
After the kernel is booted, /etc/rc is started:
Most daemons and services that come with OpenBSD by default can be started on boot by simply editing the /etc/rc.conf configuration file. To start out take a look at the default /etc/rc.conf file. You'll see lines similar to this:
ftpd_flags=NO # for non-inetd use: ftpd_flags="-D"
A line like this shows that ftpd is not to start up with the system (at least not via rc(8), read the Anonymous FTP FAQ to read more about this). In any case, each line has a comment showing you the flags for NORMAL usage of that daemon or service. This doesn't mean that you must run that daemon or service with those flags. Read the relevant manual page to see how you can have that daemon or service start up in any way you like. For example, here is the default line pertaining to httpd(8).
httpd_flags=NO # for normal use: "" (or "-DSSL" after reading ssl(8))
Here you can obviously see that starting up httpd normally no flags are necessary. So a line like: " httpd_flags=""" would be necessary. But to start httpd with ssl enabled. (Refer to the SSL FAQ or ssl(8)) You should start with a line like: "httpd_flags="-DSSL"".
A good approach is to never touch /etc/rc.conf itself. Instead, create the file /etc/rc.conf.local, copy just the lines you are about to change from /etc/rc.conf and adjust them as you like. This makes future upgrades easier -- all the changes are in the one file.
For other daemons which you might install on the system via packages or other ways, you should use the /etc/rc.local file. For example, I've installed a daemon which lies at /usr/local/sbin/daemonx. I want it to start at boot time. I would put an entry into /etc/rc.local like this:
if [ -x /usr/local/sbin/daemonx ]; then echo -n ' daemonx'; /usr/local/sbin/daemonx fi
(If the daemon does not automatically detach on startup, remember to add a "&" at the end of the command line.)
From now on, this daemon will be started at boot. You will be able to see any errors on boot, a normal boot with no errors would show a line like this:
Starting local daemons: daemonx.
/etc/rc.shutdown is a script that is run at shutdown. Anything you want done before the system shuts down should be added to this file. If you have apm, you can also set "powerdown=YES", which will give you the equivalent of "shutdown -p".
# grep relay-domains /etc/mail/sendmail.cf
The output may look something like this:
If this file doesn't exist, create it. You will need to enter the hosts who are sending mail remotely with the following syntax:
.domain.com #Allow relaying for/to any host in domain.com sub.domain.com #Allow relaying for/to sub.domain.com and any host in that domain 10.2 #Allow relaying from all hosts in the IP net 10.2.*.*
Don't forget send a 'HangUP' signal to sendmail, (a signal which causes most daemons to re-read their configuration file):
# kill -HUP `head -1 /var/run/sendmail.pid`
Most issues dealing with POP are problems with temporary files and lock files. If your pop server sends an error message such as:
-ERR Couldn't open temporary file, do you own it?
Try setting up your permissions as such:
permission in /var drwxrwxr-x 2 bin mail 512 May 26 20:08 mail permissions in /var/mail -rw------- 1 username username 0 May 26 20:08 username
Another thing to check is that the user actually owns their own /var/mail file. Of course this should be the case (as in, /var/mail/joe should be owned by joe) but if it isn't set correctly it could be the problem!
Of course, making /var/mail writable by group mail opens up some vague and obscure security problems. It is likely that you will never have problems with it. But it could (especially if you are a high profile site, ISP,...)! There are several POP servers you can install right away from the ports collection. If possible, use popa3d which is available in the OpenBSD base install. Or, you could just have the wrong options selected for your pop daemon (like dot locking). Or, you may just need to change the directory that it locks in (although then the locking would only be valuable for the POP daemon.)
Note: OpenBSD does not have a group name of "mail". You need to create this in your /etc/group file if you need it. An entry like:
would be sufficient.
By default, Sendmail uses DNS for name resolution, not the /etc/hosts file. The behavior can be changed through the use of the /etc/mail/service.switch file.
If you wish to query the hosts file before DNS servers, create a /etc/mail/service.switch file which contains the following line:
hosts files dns
If you wish to query ONLY the hosts file, use the following:
Send Sendmail a HUP signal:
# kill -HUP `head -1 /var/run/sendmail.pid`
and the changes will take effect.
OpenBSD ships with an SSL-ready httpd and RSA libraries. For use with httpd(8), you must first have a certificate created. This will be kept in /etc/ssl/ with the corresponding key in /etc/ssl/private/. The steps shown here are taken in part from the ssl(8) man page. Refer to it for further information. This FAQ entry only outlines how to create an RSA certificate for web servers, not a DSA server certificate. To find out how to do so, please refer to the ssl(8) man page.
To start off, you need to create your server key and certificate using OpenSSL:
# openssl genrsa -out /etc/ssl/private/server.key 1024
Or, if you wish the key to be encrypted with a passphrase that you will have to type in when starting servers
# openssl genrsa -des3 -out /etc/ssl/private/server.key 1024
The next step is to generate a Certificate Signing Request which is used to get a Certifying Authority (CA) to sign your certificate. To do this use the command:
# openssl req -new -key /etc/ssl/private/server.key -out /etc/ssl/private/server.csr
This server.csr file can then be given to Certifying Authority who will sign the key. One such CA is Thawte Certification which you can reach at http://www.thawte.com/.
If you cannot afford this, or just want to sign the certificate yourself, you can use the following.
# openssl x509 -req -days 365 -in /etc/ssl/private/server.csr \ -signkey /etc/ssl/private/server.key -out /etc/ssl/server.crt
With /etc/ssl/server.crt and /etc/ssl/private/server.key in place, you should be able to start httpd(8) with the -DSSL flag (see the section about rc(8) in this faq), enabling https transactions with your machine on port 443.
If you edit /etc/passwd directly, your changes will be lost. OpenBSD generates /etc/passwd dynamically with pwd_mkdb(8). The main password file in OpenBSD is /etc/master.passwd. According to pwd_mkdb(8),
FILES /etc/master.passwd current password file /etc/passwd a 6th Edition-style password file /etc/pwd.db insecure password database file /etc/pwd.db.tmp temporary file /etc/spwd.db secure password database file /etc/spwd.db.tmp temporary file
In a traditional Unix password file, such as /etc/passwd, everything including the user's encrypted password is available to anyone on the system (and is a prime target for programs such as Crack). 4.4BSD introduced the master.passwd file, which has an extended format (with additional options beyond those provided by /etc/passwd) and is only readable by root. For faster access to data, the library calls which access this data normally read /etc/pwd.db and /etc/spwd.db.
OpenBSD does come with a tool with which you should edit your password file. It is called vipw(8). Vipw will use vi (or your favourite editor defined per $EDITOR) to edit /etc/master.passwd. After you are done editing, it will re-create /etc/passwd, /etc/pwd.db, and /etc/spwd.db as per your changes. Vipw also takes care of locking these files, so that if anyone else attempts to change them at the same time, they will be denied access.
OpenBSD provides two commands for easily adding users to the system:
The easiest way to add a user in OpenBSD is to use the adduser(8) script. You can configure adduser(8) by editing /etc/adduser.conf. adduser(8) allows for consistency checks on /etc/passwd, /etc/group, and shell databases. It will create the entries and $HOME directories for you. It can even send a message to the user welcoming them. Here is an example user, testuser, being added to a system. He/she will be given the $HOME directory /home/testuser, made a member of the group guest, and given the shell /bin/ksh.
# adduser Use option ``-silent'' if you don't want to see all warnings and questions. Reading /etc/shells Reading /etc/login.conf Check /etc/master.passwd Check /etc/group Ok, let's go. Don't worry about mistakes. I will give you the chance later to correct any input. Enter username : testuser Enter full name : Test FAQ User Enter shell csh ksh nologin sh [sh]: ksh Uid : Enter Login group testuser [testuser]: guest Login group is ``guest''. Invite testuser into other groups: guest no [no]: no Login class auth-defaults auth-ftp-defaults daemon default staff [default]: Enter Enter password : Type password, then Enter Enter password again : Type password, then Enter Name: testuser Password: **** Fullname: Test FAQ User Uid: 1002 Gid: 31 (guest) Groups: guest Login Class: default HOME: /home/testuser Shell: /bin/ksh OK? (y/n) [y]: y Added user ``testuser'' Copy files from /etc/skel to /home/testuser Add another user? (y/n) [y]: n Goodbye!
To delete users you should use the rmuser(8) utility. This will remove all existence of a user. It will remove any crontab(1) entries, their $HOME dir (if it is owned by the user), and their mail. Of course it will also remove their /etc/passwd and /etc/group entries. Next is an example of removing the user that was added above. Notice you are prompted for the name, and whether or not to remove the user's home directory.
# rmuser Enter login name for user to remove: testuser Matching password entry: testuser:$2a$07$ZWnBOsbqMJ.ducQBfsTKUe3PL97Ve1AHWJ0A4uLamniLNXLeYrEie:1002 :31::0:0:Test FAQ User:/home/testuser:/bin/ksh Is this the entry you wish to remove? y Remove user's home directory (/home/testuser)? y Updating password file, updating databases, done. Updating group file: done. Removing user's home directory (/home/testuser): done.
These tools are less interactive than the adduser(8) command, which makes them easier to use in scripts.
The full set of tools is:
Being that user(8) is not interactive, the easiest way to add users efficiently is to use the adduser(8) command. The actual command /usr/sbin/user is just a frontend to the rest of the /usr/sbin/user* commands. Therefore, the following commands can be added by using user add or useradd, its your choice as to what you want, and doesn't change the use of the commands at all.
In this example, we are adding the same user with the same specifications as the user that was added above. useradd(8) is much easier to use if you know the default setting before adding a user. These settings are located in /etc/usermgmt.conf and can be viewed by doing so:
$ user add -D group users base_dir /home skel_dir /etc/skel shell /bin/csh inactive 0 expire Null (unset) range 1000..60000
The above settings are what will be set unless you specify different with command line options. For example, in our case, we want the user to go to the group guest, not users. One more little hurdle with adding users, is that passwords must be specified on the commandline. This is, the encrypted passwords, so you must first use the encrypt(1) utility to create the password. For example: OpenBSD's passwords by default use the Blowfish algorithm for 6 rounds. Here is an example line to create an encrypted password to specify to useradd(8).
$ encrypt -p -b 6 Enter string: $2a$06$YOdOZM3.4m6MObBXjeZtBOWArqC2.uRJZXUkOghbieIvSWXVJRzlq
Now that we have our encrypted password, we are ready to add the user.
# user add -p '$2a$06$YOdOZM3.4m6MObBXjeZtBOWArqC2.uRJZXUkOghbieIvSWXVJRzlq' -u 1002 \ -s /bin/ksh -c "Test FAQ User" -m -g guest testuser
Note: Make sure to use ' ' (single quotes) around the password string, not " " (double quotes) as the shell will interpret these before sending it to user(8). In addition to that, make sure you specify the -m option if you want the user's home directory created and the files from /etc/skel copied over.
To see that the user was created correctly, we can use many different utilities. Below are a few commands you can use to quickly check that everything was created correctly.
$ ls -la /home total 14 drwxr-xr-x 5 root wheel 512 May 12 14:29 . drwxr-xr-x 15 root wheel 512 Apr 25 20:52 .. drwxr-xr-x 24 ericj wheel 2560 May 12 13:38 ericj drwxr-xr-x 2 testuser guest 512 May 12 14:28 testuser $ id testuser uid=1002(testuser) gid=31(guest) groups=31(guest) $ finger testuser Login: testuser Name: Test FAQ User Directory: /home/testuser Shell: /bin/ksh Last login Sat Apr 22 16:05 (EDT) on ttyC2 No Mail. No Plan.
In addition to these commands, user(8) provides its own utility to show user characteristics, called userinfo(8).
$ userinfo testuser login testuser passwd * uid 1002 groups guest change Wed Dec 31 19:00:00 1969 class gecos Test FAQ User dir /home/testuser shell /bin/ksh expire Wed Dec 31 19:00:00 1969
To remove users with the user(8) hierarchy of commands, you will use userdel(8). This is a very simple, yet usable command. To remove the user created in the last example, simply:
# userdel -r testuser
Notice the -r option, which must be specified if you want the users home directory to be deleted as well. Alternatively, you can specify -p and not -r and this will lock the user's account, but not remove any information.
There are a few ways to do this, but a very common way to do such is to add "/usr/bin/false" into "/etc/shells". Then when you set a users shell to "/usr/bin/false", they will not be able log in interactively, but will be able to use ftp capabilities. You may also want to restrict access by Confining users to their home directory in ftpd.
Quotas are used to limit user's space that they have available to them on your disk drives. It can be very helpful in situations where you have limited resources. Quotas can be set by user and/or by group.
The first step to setting up quotas is to make sure that "option QUOTA" is in your Kernel Configuration. This option is in the GENERIC kernel. After this, you need to mark in /etc/fstab the filesystems which will have quotas enabled. The keywords userquota and groupquota should be used to mark each filesystem that you will be using quotas on. By default, the files quota.user and quota.group will be created at the root of that filesystem to hold the quota information. This default can be overridden by specifying the file name with the quota option in /etc/fstab, such as "userquota=/var/quotas/quota.user". Here is an example /etc/fstab that has one filesystem with userquotas enabled, and the quota file in a non-standard location:
/dev/wd0a / ffs rw,userquota=/var/quotas/quota.user 1 1
Now it's time to set the user's quotas. To do so you use the utility edquota(8). A simple use is just "edquota <user>". edquota(8) will use vi(1) to edit the quotas unless the environmental variable EDITOR is set to a different editor. For example:
# edquota ericj
This will give you output similar to this:
Quotas for user ericj: /: blocks in use: 62, limits (soft = 0, hard = 0) inodes in use: 25, limits (soft = 0, hard = 0)
To add limits, edit it to give results like this:
Quotas for user ericj: /: blocks in use: 62, limits (soft = 1000, hard = 1050) inodes in use: 25, limits (soft = 0, hard = 0)
Note that the quota allocation is in 1k blocks. In this case, the softlimit is set to 1000k, and the hardlimit is set to 1050k. A softlimit is a limit where the user is just warned when they cross it and have until their grace period is up to get their disk usage below their limit. Grace periods can be set by using the -t option on edquota(8). After the grace period is over the softlimit is handled as a hardlimit. This usually results in an allocation failure.
Now that the quotas are set, you need to turn the quotas on. To do this use quotaon(8). For example:
# quotaon -a
This will go through /etc/fstab to turn on the filesystems with quota options. Now that quotas are up and running, you can view them using quota(1). Using a command of "quota <user>" will give that user's information. When called with no arguments, the quota(1) command will give your quota statistics. For example:
# quota ericj
Will result in output similar to this:
Disk quotas for user ericj (uid 1001): Filesystem blocks quota limit grace files quota limit grace / 62 1000 1050 27 0 0
By default quotas set in /etc/fstab will be started on boot. To turn them off use
# quotaoff -a
OpenBSD includes KerberosV as a pre-installed component of the default system.
For more information on KerberosV, from your OpenBSD system, use the command:
# info heimdal
Anonymous FTP allows users without accounts to access files on your computer via the File Transfer Protocol. This will give an overview of setting up the anonymous FTP server, and its logging, etc.
To start off, you need to have an ftp account on your system. This account should not have a usable password. Here we will set the login directory to /home/ftp, but you can put it wherever you want. When using anonymous ftp, the ftp daemon will chroot itself to the home directory of the ftp user. To read up more on that, read the ftpd(8) and chroot(2) man pages. Here is an example of adding the ftp user. I will do this using adduser(8). We also need to add /usr/bin/false to our /etc/shells, this is the "shell" that we will be giving to the ftp user. This won't allow them to login, even though we will give them an empty password. To do this you can simply do
After this, you are ready to add the ftp user:
echo /usr/bin/false >> /etc/shells
# adduser Use option ``-silent'' if you don't want to see all warnings and questions. Reading /etc/shells Reading /etc/login.conf Check /etc/master.passwd Check /etc/group Ok, let's go. Don't worry about mistakes. I will give you the chance later to correct any input. Enter username : ftp Enter full name : anonymous ftp Enter shell csh false ksh nologin sh tcsh zsh [sh]: false Uid : Enter Login group ftp [ftp]: Enter Login group is ``ftp''. Invite ftp into other groups: guest no [no]: no Login class auth-defaults auth-ftp-defaults daemon default staff [default]: Enter Enter password : Enter Set the password so that user cannot logon? (y/n) [n]: y Name: ftp Password: **** Fullname: anonymous ftp Uid: 1002 Gid: 1002 (ftp) Groups: ftp Login Class: default HOME: /home/ftp Shell: /usr/bin/false OK? (y/n) [y]: y Added user ``ftp'' Copy files from /etc/skel to /home/ftp Add another user? (y/n) [y]: n Goodbye!
Along with the user, this created the directory /home/ftp. This is what we want, but there are some changes that we will have to make to get it ready for anonymous ftp. Again these changes are explained in the ftpd(8) man page.
You do not need to make a /home/ftp/usr or /home/ftp/bin directory.
Note that all these directories should be owned by ''root''. Here is a listing of what the directories should look like after their creation.
# pwd /home # ls -laR ftp total 5 dr-xr-xr-x 5 root ftp 512 Jul 6 11:33 . drwxr-xr-x 7 root wheel 512 Jul 6 10:58 .. dr-x--x--x 2 root ftp 512 Jul 6 11:34 etc dr-xr-xr-x 2 root ftp 512 Jul 6 11:33 pub ftp/etc: total 43 dr-x--x--x 2 root ftp 512 Jul 6 11:34 . dr-xr-xr-x 5 root ftp 512 Jul 6 11:33 .. -r--r--r-- 1 root ftp 316 Jul 6 11:34 group -r--r--r-- 1 root ftp 40960 Jul 6 11:34 pwd.db ftp/pub: total 2 dr-xr-xr-x 2 root ftp 512 Jul 6 11:33 . dr-xr-xr-x 5 root ftp 512 Jul 6 11:33 ..
You can choose to start ftpd either by inetd(8) or from the rc scripts. These examples will show our daemon being started from inetd.conf. First we must become familiar with some of the options to ftpd. The default line from /etc/inetd.conf is:
ftp stream tcp nowait root /usr/libexec/ftpd ftpd -US
Here ftpd is invoked with -US. This will log anonymous connections to /var/log/ftpd and concurrent sessions to /var/run/utmp. That will allow for these sessions to be seen via who(1). For some, you might want to run only an anonymous server, and disallow ftp for users. To do so you should invoke ftpd with the -A option. Here is a line that starts ftpd up for anonymous connections only. It also uses -ll which logs each connection to syslog, along with the get, retrieve, etc, ftp commands.
ftp stream tcp nowait root /usr/libexec/ftpd ftpd -llUSA
Note: For people using HIGH traffic ftp servers, you might not want to invoke ftpd from inetd.conf. The best option is to comment the ftpd line from inetd.conf and start ftpd from rc.conf.local along with the -D option. This will start ftpd as a daemon, and has much less overhead as starting it from inetd. Here is an example line to start it from rc.conf.local.
ftpd_flags="-DllUSA" # for non-inetd use: ftpd_flags="-D"
This of course only works if you have ftpd taken out of /etc/inetd.conf and made inetd re-read its configuration file.
By default, when logging in by ftp, users can change to any directory on the filesystem that they have access to. This may not be desirable in some cases. It is possible to restrict what users may see through ftp sessions by chrooting them to their home directory.
If you only wish to allow chrooted ftp logins, use the -A option to ftpd(8).
If you wish to apply them more finely, OpenBSD's login capability infrastructure and ftpd(8) together make this easy.
Users in a login class with the ftp-chroot variable set are automatically chrooted. Additionally, you can add a username to the file /etc/ftpchroot to chroot those usernames. A user only needs to be listed in one of these locations.
Even with OpenBSD, bugs happen. Some bugs may lead to reliability issues (i.e., something may cause the system to stop functioning as desired). Other bugs may lead to security vulnerabilities (which may allow others to "use" your computer in unintended ways). When a critical bug is found, the fix will be committed to the -current source tree, and patches will be released for the supported releases of OpenBSD. These patches appear on the errata web page, and are separated into "common" errata that impact all platforms, and errata that impact only one or more, but not all, platforms.
Note, however, that patches aren't made for new additions to OpenBSD, and are only done for important reliability fixes or security problems that should be addressed right away on impacted systems (which is often NOT all systems, depending on their purpose).
There are three ways to update your system with patched code:
All patches posted to the errata web page are patches directly against the indicated release's source tree. Patches against the latest CVS tree might also include other changes that wouldn't be wanted on a release system. This is important: If you have installed a snapshot, checked out the source trees at the time you obtained that snapshot and attempt to patch it using a published patch, you may well find the patch doesn't apply, as that code may have changed.
Patches for the OpenBSD Operating System are distributed as "Unified diffs", which are text files that hold differences to the original source code. They are NOT distributed in binary form. This means that to patch your system you must have the source code from the RELEASE version of OpenBSD readily available. In general, you should have the entire source tree available. If you are running a release from official CDROM, the source trees are available on disk 3, they are also available as files from the FTP servers. We will assume you have the entire tree checked out.
For our example here, we will look at patch 001 for OpenBSD 3.6 dealing with the st(4) driver, which handles tape drives. Without this patch, recovering data from backups is quite difficult. People using a tape drive need this patch, however those without a tape drive may have no particular need to install it. Let's look at the patch:
As you will note, the top of the patch includes brief instructions on applying it. We will assume you have put this patch into the /usr/src directory, in which case, the following steps are used:
# more 001_st.patch Apply by doing: cd /usr/src patch -p0 < 001_st.patch Rebuild your kernel. Index: sys/scsi/st.c =================================================================== RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/scsi/st.c,v retrieving revision 1.41 retrieving revision 126.96.36.199 diff -u -p -r1.41 -r188.8.131.52 --- sys/scsi/st.c 1 Aug 2004 23:01:06 -0000 1.41 +++ sys/scsi/st.c 2 Nov 2004 01:05:50 -0000 184.108.40.206 @@ -1815,7 +1815,7 @@ st_interpret_sense(xs) u_int8_t skey = sense->flags & SSD_KEY; int32_t info; - if (((sense->flags & SDEV_OPEN) == 0) || + if (((sc_link->flags & SDEV_OPEN) == 0) || (serr != 0x70 && serr != 0x71)) return (EJUSTRETURN); /* let the generic code handle it */
Note the "Hunk #1 succeeded" message above. This indicates the patch was applied successfully. Many patches are more complex than this one, and will involve multiple hunks and multiple files, in which case, you should verify that all hunks succeeded on all files. If they did not, it normally means your source tree is not right, you didn't follow instructions carefully, or your patch was mangled. Patches are very sensitive to "white space" -- copying and pasting from your browser will often change tab characters into spaces or otherwise alter the white space of a file, making it not apply.
# cd /usr/src # patch -p0 < 001_st.patch Hmm... Looks like a unified diff to me... The text leading up to this was: -------------------------- |Apply by doing: | cd /usr/src | patch -p0 < 001_st.patch | |Rebuild your kernel. | |Index: sys/scsi/st.c |=================================================================== |RCS file: /cvs/src/sys/scsi/st.c,v |retrieving revision 1.41 |retrieving revision 220.127.116.11 |diff -u -p -r1.41 -r18.104.22.168 |--- sys/scsi/st.c 1 Aug 2004 23:01:06 -0000 1.41 |+++ sys/scsi/st.c 2 Nov 2004 01:05:50 -0000 22.214.171.124 -------------------------- Patching file sys/scsi/st.c using Plan A... Hunk #1 succeeded at 1815. <-- Look for this message! done
At this point, you can build the kernel as normal, install it and reboot the system.
Not all patches are for the kernel. In some cases, you will have to rebuild individual utilities. At other times, will require recompiling all utilities statically linked to a patched library. Follow the guidance in the header of the patch, and if uncertain, rebuild the entire system.
Patches that are irrelevant to your particular system need not be applied -- usually. For example, if you did not have a tape drive on your system, you would not benefit from the above patch. However, patches are assumed to be applied "in order" -- it is possible that a later patch is dependent upon an earlier one. Be aware of this if you elect to "pick and choose" which patches you apply, and if in doubt, apply them all, in order.
In OpenBSD, the Apache httpd(8) server has been chroot(2)ed by default. While this is a tremendous boost to security, it can create issues, if you are not prepared.
Put bluntly, chroot(2)ing Apache is something not done by default in most other operating systems. Many applications and system configurations will not work in a chroot(2) without some customization. Further, it must be remembered that security and convenience are often not compatible goals. OpenBSD's implementation of Apache does not compromise security for features or "ease".
Yes, the last line attempts to restart Apache immediately, and in case that fails it waits a few seconds and tries again. And yes, that does mean that for a few seconds every time you do your log rotation, your web server will be unavailable. While this could be annoying, any attempt to permit httpd(8) to reopen files after chroot(2)ing would defeat the very purpose of the chroot! There are also other strategies available, including logging to a pipe(2), and using an external log rotator at the other end of the pipe(2).
# apachectl stop rename your log files # apachectl start ; sleep 10 ; apachectl start
First, we install the wwwcount package. We configure it and test it, and we find it doesn't seem to work, we get an Apache message saying "Internal Server Error". First step is to stop and restart Apache with the -u switch to verify that the problem is the chroot(2)ing, and not the system configuration.
After doing this, we see the counter works properly, at least after we change the ownership on a directory so that Apache (and the CGIs it runs) can write to the files it keeps. So, we definitely have a chroot problem, so we stop and restart Apache again, using the default chrooting:
# apachectl stop /usr/sbin/apachectl stop: httpd stopped # httpd -u
# apachectl stop /usr/sbin/apachectl stop: httpd stopped # httpd
A good starting point would be to assume wwwcount uses some libraries and other files it can't get to in the chroot. We can use the ldd(1) command to find out the dynamic object dependencies that the CGI needs:
Ok, here is a problem, two files that are not available in the chroot(2) environment. So, we copy them over:
# cd /var/www/cgi-bin/ # ldd Count.cgi Count.cgi: Start End Type Ref Name 00000000 00000000 exe 1 Count.cgi 03791000 237ca000 rlib 1 /usr/lib/libc.so.30.3 03db4000 03db4000 rtld 1 /usr/libexec/ld.so
and try the counter again.
# mkdir -p /var/www/usr/lib /var/www/usr/libexec # cp /usr/lib/libc.so.30.3 /var/www/usr/lib # cp /usr/libexec/ld.so /var/www/usr/libexec
Well, now the program is running at least, and giving us error messages directly: "Unable to open config file for reading". Progress, but not done yet. The configuration file is normally in /var/www/wwwcount/conf, but within the chroot environment, that would seem to be /wwwcount/conf. Our options are to either recompile the program to make it work where the files are now, or move the data files. As we installed from a package, we'll just move the data file. In order to use the same config either chroot(2)ed or not, we'll use a symbolic link:
Note that the symbolic link is crafted to work within the chroot. Again, we test... and we find we have yet another issue. Now wwwcount is complaining that it can't find the "strip image" files it uses to display messages. After a bit of searching, we find those are stored in /usr/local/lib/wwwcount, so we have to copy those into the chroot, as well.
# mkdir -p /var/www/var/www # cd /var/www/var/www # ln -s ../../wwwcount wwwcount
we test again... and it works!
# tar cf - /usr/local/lib/wwwcount | (cd /var/www; tar xpf - )
Note that we have copied over only files that are absolutely required for operation. In general, only the minimum files needed to run an application should be copied into the chroot.
Not every application can or should be chroot(2)ed.
The goal is a secure web server, chroot(2)ing is just a tool to accomplish this, it is not the goal itself. Remember, the starting configuration of the OpenBSD chroot(2)ed Apache is where the user the httpd(8) program is running as can not run any programs, can not alter any files, and can not assume another user's identity. Loosen these restrictions, you have lessened your security, chroot or no chroot.
Some applications are pretty simple, and chroot(2)ing them makes sense. Others are very complex, and are either not worth the effort of forcing them into a chroot(2), or by the time you copy enough of the system into the chroot, you have lost the benefit of the chroot(2) environment. For example, the OpenWebMail program requires the ability to read and write to the mail directory, the user's home directory, and must be able to work as any user on the system. Attempting to push it into a chroot would be completely pointless, as you would end up disabling all the benefits of chroot(2)ing. Even with an application as simple as the above counter, it must write to disk (to keep track of its counters), so some benefit of the chroot(2) is lost.
Any application which has to assume root privileges to operate is pointless to attempt to chroot(2), as root can generally escape a chroot(2).
Do not forget, if the chrooting process for your application is too difficult, you may not upgrade or update the system as often as you should. This could end up making your system LESS secure than a more maintainable system with the chroot feature deactivated.
The default shell for root on OpenBSD is ksh.
A traditional Unix guideline is to only use statically compiled shells for root, because if your system comes up in single user mode, non-root partitions won't be mounted and dynamically linked shells won't be able to access libraries located in the /usr partition. This isn't actually a significant issue for OpenBSD, as the system will prompt you for a shell when it comes up in single user mode, and the default is sh. The three standard shells in OpenBSD (csh, sh and ksh) are all statically linked, and thus usable in single user mode.
Users comfortable with bash, often used on Linux systems, will probably find ksh very familiar. Ksh(1) provides most of the commonly used features in bash, including tab completion, command line editing and history via the arrow keys, and CTRL-A/CTRL-E to jump to beginning/end of the command line. If other features of bash are desired, bash itself can be loaded via either packages or ports.
The command prompt of ksh can easily be changed to something providing more information than the default "$ " by setting the PS1 variable. For example, inserting the following line:
in your /etc/profile produces the following command prompt:
export PS1='$PWD $ '
See the file /etc/ksh.kshrc, which includes many useful features and examples, and may be invoked in your user's .profile.
OpenBSD's ksh(1) has been enhanced with a number of "special characters" for the primary prompt string, PS1, similar to those used in bash. For example:
\e - Insert an ASCII escape character.(see the ksh(1) man page for more details, and many, many more special characters! Also note the "$" character has special meaning inside double quotes, so handle it carefully)
\h - The hostname, minus domain name.
\H - The full hostname, including domain name.
\n - Insert a newline character.
\t - The current time, in 24-hour HH:MM:SS format.
\u - The current user's username.
\w - The current working directory. $HOME is abbreviated as `~'.
\W - The basename of the current working directory.
\$ - Displays "#" for root users, "$" for non-root users.
One could use the following command:
to give an overly verbose but somewhat useful prompt.
export PS1="\n\u@\H\n\w \\$ "
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