3.4 Policy
Policy
helps to define what you consider to be valuable, and it specifies
which steps should be taken to safeguard those assets.
Policy can be formulated in a number of different ways. You could
write a very simple, general policy of a few pages that covers most
possibilities. You could also craft a policy for different sets of
assets: for example, a policy for email, a policy for personnel data,
and a policy on accounting information. A third approach, taken by
many large corporations, is to have a small, simple policy augmented
with standards and guidelines for appropriate behavior.
We'll briefly outline this latter approach, with the
reader's understanding that simpler policies can be
crafted; more information is given in a number of books cited in
Appendix C.
3.4.1 The Role of Policy
Policy plays three major roles. First, it
makes clear what is being protected and why. Second, it clearly
states the responsibility for that protection. Third, it provides a
ground on which to interpret and resolve any later conflicts that
might arise. What the policy should not do is
list specific threats, machines, or individuals by name—the
policy should be general and change little over time. For example:
Information and information-processing facilities are a critical
resource for the Big Whammix Corporation. Information should be
protected commensurate with its value to Big Whammix, and consistent
with applicable law. All
employees share in the responsibility
for the protection and supervision of information that is produced,
manipulated, received, or transmitted in their departments. All
employees likewise share in the responsibility for the maintenance,
proper operation, and protection of all information-processing
resources of Big Whammix.
Information to be protected is any information discovered, learned,
derived, or handled during the course of business that is not
generally known outside of Big Whammix. This includes trade secret
information (ours, and that of other organizations and companies),
patent disclosure information, personnel data, financial information,
information about any business opportunities, and anything else that
conveys an advantage to Big Whammix so long as it is not disclosed.
Personal information about employees, customers, and vendors is also
considered to be confidential and worth protecting.
In the course of their work, Big Whammix employees will acquire
confidential information, and are responsible for protecting their
own knowledge. All information stored in a tangible form at Big
Whammix—on computer media, on printouts, in microfilm, on
CD-ROM, on audio or videotape, on photographic media, or in any other
stored, tangible form—is the responsibility of the Chief
Information Honcho (CIH). Thus, Big Whammix facilities should be used
only for functions related to the business of Big Whammix, as
determined by the President. The CIH shall be responsible for the
protection of all information and information-processing capabilities
belonging to Big Whammix, whether located on company property or not.
He will have authority to act commensurate with this responsibility,
with the approval of the President of Big Whammix. The CIH shall
formulate appropriate standards and guidelines, according to good
business practice, to ensure the protection and continued operation
of information processing.
In this example policy, note particularly the definition of what will
be protected, who is responsible for protecting it, and who is
charged with creating additional guidelines. This policy can be shown
to all employees, and to outsiders to explain company policy. It
should remain current no matter which operating system is in use, or
who the CIH may happen to be.
3.4.2 Standards
Standards are intended to codify the
successful practice of security in an organization. They are
generally phrased in terms of
"shall." Standards are generally
platform-independent, and imply at least a metric to determine if
they have been met. They are developed in support of policy, and
change slowly over time. Standards might cover such issues as how to
screen new hires, how long to keep backups, and how to test UPS
systems.
For example, consider a standard for
backups. It might state:
Backups shall be made of all online data and software on a regular
basis. In no case will backups be done any less often than once every
72 hours of normal business operation. All backups should be kept for
a period of at least six months; the first backup in January and July
of each year will be kept indefinitely at an off-site, secured
storage location. At least one full backup of the entire system shall
be taken every other week. All backup media will meet accepted
industry standards for its type, to be readable after a minimum of
five years in unattended storage.
This standard does not name a particular backup mechanism or software
package. It clearly states, however, what will be stored, how long it
will be stored, and how often it will be made.
Consider a possible standard for
authentication:
Every user account on each multiuser machine shall have only one
person authorized to use it. That user will be required to
authenticate his or her identity to the system using some positive
proof of identity. This proof of identity can be through the use of
an approved authentication token or smart card, an approved one-time
password mechanism, or an approved biometric unit. Reusable passwords
will not be used for primary authentication on any machine that is
ever connected to a network or modem, that is portable and carried
off company property, or that is used outside of a private office.
3.4.3 Guidelines
Guidelines are the
"should" statements in policies.
The intent of guidelines is to interpret standards for a particular
environment—whether it is a software environment or a physical
environment. Unlike standards, guidelines may be violated, if
necessary. As the name suggests, guidelines are not usually used as
standards of performance, but as ways to help guide behavior.
Here is a typical guideline for backups:
Backups on Unix-based machines should be done with the
dump program. Backups should be done nightly, in
single-user mode, for systems that are not in 24-hour production use.
Backups for systems in 24-hour production mode should be made at the
shift change closest to midnight, when the system is less loaded. All
backups will be read and verified immediately after being written.
Level 0 dumps will be done for the first backup in January and July.
Level 3 backups should be done on the 1st and 15th of every month.
Level 5 backups should be done every Monday and Thursday night,
unless a level 0 or level 3 backup is done on that day. Level 7
backups should be done every other night except on holidays.
Once per week, the administrator will pick a file at random from a
backup made that week. The operator will be required to recover that
file as a test of the backup procedures.
Guidelines tend to be very specific to particular architectures and
even to specific machines. They also tend to change more often than
do standards, to reflect changing conditions.
3.4.4 Some Key Ideas in Developing a Workable Policy
The role of policy (and associated
standards and guidelines) is to help protect those items you
(collectively) view as important. They do not need to be overly
specific and complicated in most instances. Sometimes, a simple
policy statement is sufficient for your environment, as in the
following example:
The use and protection of this system is everyone's
responsibility. Only do things you would want everyone else to do,
too. Respect the privacy of other users. If you find a problem, fix
it yourself or report it right away. Abide by all applicable laws
concerning use of the system. Be responsible for what you do and
always identify yourself. Have fun!
Other times, a more formal policy, reviewed by a law firm and various
security consultants, is the way you need to go to protect your
assets. Each organization will be different. We know of some
organizations that have volumes of policies, standards, and
guidelines for their Unix systems.
There are some key ideas to your policy formation, though, that need
to be mentioned more explicitly. These are in addition to the two we
mentioned at the beginning of this chapter.
3.4.4.1 Assign an owner
Every
piece of information and equipment to be protected should have an
assigned "owner." The owner is the
person who is responsible for the information, including its copying,
destruction, backups, and other aspects of protection. This is also
the person who has some authority with respect to granting access to
the information.
The problem with security in many environments is that there is
important information that has no clear owner. As a result, users are
never sure who makes decisions about the storage of the information,
or who regulates access to the information. Information (and even
equipment!) sometimes disappears without anyone noticing for a long
period of time because there is no
"owner" to contact or monitor the
situation.
3.4.4.2 Be positive
People respond better to
positive statements than to negative ones. Instead of building long
lists of "don't do
this" statements, think how to phrase the same
information positively. The abbreviated policy statement above could
have been written as a set of
"don'ts" as
follows, but consider how much better it read originally:
It's your responsibility not to allow misuse of the
system. Don't do things you
wouldn't want others to do, too.
Don't violate the privacy of others. If you find a
problem, don't keep it a secret if you
can't fix it yourself. Don't
violate any laws concerning use of the system. Don't
try to shift responsibility for what you do to someone else and
don't hide your identity. Don't
have a bad time!
3.4.4.3 Remember that employees are people too
When writing policies, keep users in mind.
They will make mistakes, and they will misunderstand. The policy
should not suggest that users will be thrown to the wolves if an
error occurs.
Furthermore, consider that
information systems may contain information about users that they
would like to keep somewhat private. This may include some email,
personnel records, and job evaluations. This material should be
protected, too, although you may not be able to guarantee absolute
privacy. Be considerate of users' needs and
feelings.
3.4.4.4 Concentrate on education
You would be wise to include standards
for training and retraining of all users. Every user should have
basic security awareness education, with some form of periodic
refresher material (even if the refresher involves only being given a
copy of this book!). Trained and educated users are less likely to
fall for scams and social-engineering attacks. They are also more
likely to be happy about security measures if they understand why
these measures are in place.
A crucial part of any security system is giving staff time and
support for additional training and education. There are always new
tools, new threats, new techniques, and new information to be
learned. If staff members are spending 60 hours each week chasing
down phantom PC viruses and doing backups, they will not be as
effective as a staff given a few weeks of training time each year.
Furthermore, they are more likely to be happy with their work if they
are given a chance to grow and learn on the job, and are allowed to
spend evenings and weekends with their families instead of trying to
catch up on installing software and making backups.
3.4.4.5 Have authority commensurate with responsibility
- Spaf's first principle of security administration:
-
If you have responsibility for security, but have no
authority to set rules or punish violators, your own role in the
organization is to take the blame when something big goes
wrong.
Consider the case we heard about in which a system administrator
caught one of the programmers trying to break into the
root account of the payroll system. Further
investigation revealed that the account of the user was filled with
password files taken from machines around the Net, many with cracked
passwords. The administrator immediately shut down the account and
made an appointment with the programmer's
supervisor.
The supervisor was not supportive. She phoned the vice president of
the company and demanded that the programmer get his account
back—she needed his help to meet her group deadline. The system
administrator was admonished for shutting down the account and was
told not to do it again.
Three months later, the administrator was fired when someone broke
into the payroll system he was charged with protecting. The
programmer allegedly received a promotion and raise, despite an
apparent ready excess of cash.
If you find yourself in a similar situation, polish up your
resumé and start hunting for a new job before
you're forced into a job search by circumstances you
can't control.
3.4.4.6 Be sure you know your security perimeter
When you write your policy, you want to be certain to include all of
the various systems, networks, personnel, and information storage
within your security perimeter. The perimeter
defines what is "within" your
control and concern. When formulating your policies, you need to be
certain you include coverage of everything that is within your
perimeter or that could enter your perimeter and interact with your
information resources.
In earlier years, many organizations defined their IT security
perimeter to be their walls and fences. Nowadays, the perimeter is
less concrete.
For example, consider the following when developing your policies:
Portable computers and PDAs can be used to access information while
away from your physical location. Furthermore, they may store
sensitive information, including IP addresses, phone numbers, and
passwords. These systems should have minimum levels of protection,
including passwords, encryption, and physical security markings.
Users should have additional training and awareness about dangers of
theft and eavesdropping.
Wireless networks used on the premises or otherwise connected to site
resources may be connected to by outsiders using directional antennas
or simply parked in a car outside the building with a laptop.
Wireless networks should be configured and protected to prevent
sensitive material from being observed outside, and to prevent
insertion of malicious code by attackers.
Computers used at home by the organization's
personnel are subject to penetration, theft, and the accidental
insertion of malicious code. They may also be used contrary to
organizational policy (e.g., to run a business, or host a web server
with questionable content). The policy needs to make clear how these
machines are to be used, protected, and audited.
Media is dense and portable. If someone makes a CD or DVD of the
company financial records to use at a remote site, what happens if
the media is stolen or misplaced? Policies should govern who is
allowed to take media off-site, how it should be protected (including
encryption), and what will happen if it is lost or stolen. They
should also detail how and when previously used media will be
destroyed to limit its potential exposure.
What are the policies governing people who bring their own PDAs or
laptops on site for meetings or simply while visiting? What are the
rules governing their connection to site networks, phone lines,
printers, or other devices?
What concerns are there about shipping computers or storage devices
offsite for maintenance. What if there is sensitive material on disk?
What about leased equipment that is returned to the owner?
If business partners or contractors have access to your equipment, at
your site or at theirs, who guards the material? How is it kept from
unwanted contamination or commingling with their own sensitive data?
What policies will be in place to govern the handling of information
provided to your organization under trade secret protection or
license? Who is responsible for protecting the information, and where
can it be kept and stored?
What policies govern non-computer information-processing equipment?
For instance, what policies govern use of the printers, copiers, and
fax machines? (Sensitive information on paper is no less sensitive
than online information.)
Thinking about all these issues before a problem occurs helps keep
the problems from occurring. Building sensible statements into your
security policy helps everyone understand the concerns and to take
the proper precautions.
3.4.4.7 Pick a basic philosophy
Decide if you are going to build around the model of
"Everything that is not specifically denied is
permitted" or "Everything that is
not specifically permitted is denied." Then be
consistent in how you define everything else.
3.4.4.8 Defend in depth
When you
plan your defenses and policy, don't stop at one
layer. Institute multiple, redundant, independent levels of
protection. Then include auditing and monitoring to ensure that those
protections are working. The chance of an attacker's
evading one set of defenses is far greater than the chance of his
evading three layers plus an alarm system.
Running a secure computer is a lot of
work. If you don't have time for the full
risk-assessment and cost-benefit analysis described in this chapter,
we recommend that you at least follow these four easy steps:
Decide how important security is for your site. If you think security
is very important and that your organization will suffer significant
loss in the case of a security breach, then response must be given
sufficient priority. Assigning an overworked programmer who has no
formal security training to handle security on a part-time basis is a
sure invitation to problems.
Involve and educate your user
community. Do the users of your site understand the dangers and risks
involved with poor security practices (and what those practices are)?
Your users should know what to do and who to call if they observe
something suspicious or inappropriate. Educating your user population
helps make them a part of your security system. Keeping users
ignorant of system limitations and operation will not increase the
system security—there are always other sources of information
for determined attackers.
Devise a plan for making and storing backups of your system data. You
should have off-site backups so that even in the event of a major
disaster, you can reconstruct your systems. We discuss this more in
Chapter 8 and Chapter 18.
Stay inquisitive and suspicious. If something happens that appears
unusual, suspect that there is an intruder and investigate.
You'll usually find that the problem is only a bug
or a mistake in the way a system resource is being used. But
occasionally, you may discover something more serious. For this
reason, each time something happens that you can't
definitively explain, you should suspect that there is a security
problem and investigate accordingly.
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3.4.5 Risk Management Means Common Sense
The key to successful risk
assessment is to identify all of the possible threats to your system,
and to defend against those attacks which you think are realistic
threats.
Simply because people are the weak link doesn't mean
we should ignore other safeguards. People are unpredictable, but
breaking into a dial-in modem that does not have a password is still
cheaper than a bribe. So, we use technological defenses where we can,
and we improve our personnel security by educating our staff and
users.
We also rely on defense in depth: we
apply multiple levels of defenses as backups in case some fail. For
instance, we buy that second UPS system, or we put a separate lock on
the computer room door even though we have a lock on the building
door. These combinations can be defeated too, but we increase the
effort and cost for an enemy to do that...and maybe we can convince
them that doing so isn't worth the trouble. At the
very least, you can hope to slow them down enough so that your
monitoring and alarms will bring help before anything significant is
lost or damaged.
With these limits in mind, you need to approach computer security
with a thoughtfully developed set of priorities. You
can't protect against every possible threat.
Sometimes you should allow a problem to occur rather than prevent it,
and then clean up afterwards. For instance, your efforts might be
cheaper and less trouble if you let the systems go down in a power
failure and then reboot than if you bought a UPS system. And some
things you simply don't bother to defend against,
either because they are too unlikely (e.g., an alien invasion from
space), too difficult to defend against (e.g., a nuclear blast within
500 yards of your data center), or simply too catastrophic and
horrible to contemplate (e.g., your management decides to switch all
your Unix machines to some well-known PC operating system). The key
to good management is knowing what things you will worry about, and
to what degree.
Decide what you want to protect and what the costs might be to
prevent certain losses versus the cost of recovering from those
losses. Then make your decisions for action and security measures
based on a prioritized list of the most critical needs. Be sure you
include more than your computers in this analysis:
don't forget that your backup tapes, your network
connections, your terminals, and your documentation are all part of
the system and represent potential loss. The safety of your
personnel, your corporate site, and your reputation are also very
important and should be included in your plans.
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