The NTPv3 specification RFC-1305 defines an scheme which provides cryptographic
authentication of received NTP packets. Originally, this was done using
the Data Encryption Standard (DES) operating in Cipher Block Chaining (CBC)
algorithm, commonly called DES-CBC. Subsequently, this was augmented by
the RSA Message Digest 5 (MD5) using a private key, commonly called keyed-MD5
algorithm. Either algorithm computes a digital signature, or message digest,
which can be used by the receiver to verify the sender has the correct
private key. NTPv4 retains this scheme and, in addition, provides a new
autokey scheme based on reverse hashing and public keys. Authentication
can be configured separately for each association and is enabled using
the key or autokey subcommands on the peer,
server, broadcast and manycastclient commands
as described in the Configuration Options
The most important authentication function is to verify that a server
can be trusted to mobilize a persistent association at a client. If this
function is not available, the client is vulnerable to any rogue server
in the Internet to destabilize the client clock. For this reason, and by
default, an association will not be mobilized unless the server has the
correct key and key identifier. In some cases, it may be desirable to allow
an association to be mobilized in other cases. If so, the disable auth
command can be included in the configuration file as described in
the Configuration Options page.
Private Key Scheme
The original RFC-1305 specification allows any one of possibly 65,536 keys,
each distinguished a 32-bit key identifier, to authenticate an association.
The servers involved must agree on the key and key identifier to authenticate
their messages. Keys and related information are specified in a key file,
usually called ntp.keys, which should be exchanged and stored
using secure procedures beyond the scope of the NTP protocol itself. Besides
the keys used for ordinary NTP associations, additional ones can be used
as passwords for the ntpq and ntpdc
When ntpd is first started, it reads the key file and installs
the keys in the key cache. However, the keys must be activated before they
can be used with the trusted command. This allows, for instance,
the installation of possibly several batches of keys and then activating
or inactivating each batch remotely using ntpdc. This also provides
a revocation capability that can be used if a key becomes compromised.
The requestkey command selects the key used as the password for
the ntpdc utility, while the controlkey command selects
the key used as the password for the the ntpq utility.
The original NTPv3 authentication scheme described in RFC-1305 continues
to be supported. In NTPv4, an additional authentication scheme called autokey
is available. It operates much like the S-KEY scheme, in that a session
key list is constructed and the entries used in reverse order. A description
of the scheme, along with a comprehensive security analysis, is contained
in a technical report available from the IETF web page www.ietf.org
The autokey scheme is specifically designed for multicast modes, where
clients normally do not send messages to the server. In these modes, the
server uses the scheme to generate a key list by repeated hashing of a
secret value. The list is used in reverse order to generate a unique session
key for each message sent. The client regenerates the session key and verifies
the hash matches the previous session key. Each message contains the public
values binding the session key to the secret value, but these values need
to be verified only when the server generates a new key list or more than
four server messages have been lost.
The scheme is appropriate for client/server and symmetric-peer modes
as well. In these modes, the client generates a session key as in multicast
modes. The server regenerates the session key and uses it to formulates
a reply using its own public values. The client verifies the key identifier
of the reply matches the request, verifies the public values and validates
the message. In peer mode, each peer independently generates a key list
and operates as in the multicast mode.
The autokey scheme requires no change to the NTP packet header format
or message authentication code (MAC), which is appended to the header;
however, if autokey is in use, an extensions field is inserted between
the header and MAC. The extensions field contains a random public value
which is updated at intervals specified by the revoke command, together
with related cryptographic values used in the signing algorithm. The format
of the extensions field is defined in Internet Draft draft-NTP- auth-coexist-00.txt.
The MAC itself is constructed in the same way as NTPv3, but using the original
NTP header and the extensions field padded to a 64-bit boundary. Each new
public value is encrypted by the host private value. It is the intent of
the design, not yet finalized, that the public value, encrypted public
value, public key and certificate be embedded in the extensions field where
the client can decrypt as needed. However, the relatively expensive encryption
and decryption operations are necessary only when the public value is changed.
Note that both the original NTPv3 authentication scheme and the new
NTPv4 autokey scheme operate separately for each configured association,
so there may be several session key lists operating independently at the
same time. Since all keys, including session keys, occupy the same key
cache, provisions have been made to avoid collisions, where some random
roll happens to collide with another already generated. Since something
like four billion different session key identifiers are available, the
chances are small that this might happen. If it happens during generation,
the generator terminates the current session key list. By the time the
next list is generated, the collided key will probably have been expired
While permanent keys have lifetimes that expire only when manually revoked,
random session keys have a lifetime specified at the time of generation.
When generating a key list for an association, the lifetime of each key
is set to expire one poll interval later than it is scheduled to be used.
The maximum lifetime of any key in the list is specified by the autokey
command. Lifetime enforcement is a backup to the normal procedure that
revokes the last-used key at the time the next key on the key list is used.
Specifies the file name containing the encryption keys and key identifiers
used by ntpd, ntpq and ntpdc when operating
in authenticated mode. The format of this file is described later in this
trustedkey key [ ... ]
Specifies the encryption key identifiers which are trusted for the purposes
of authenticating peers suitable for synchronization, as well as keys used
by the ntpq and ntpdc programs. The authentication procedures
require that both the local and remote servers share the same key and key
identifier for this purpose, although different keys can be used with different
servers. The key arguments are 32-bit unsigned integers
with values less than 65,536. Note that NTP key 0 is used to indicate an
invalid key and/or key identifier, so should not be used for any other
Specifies the key identifier to use with the ntpdc program, which
uses a proprietary protocol specific to this implementation of ntpd.
This program is useful to diagnose and repair problems that affect ntpd
operation. The key argument to this command is a 32-bit
key identifier for a previously defined trusted key. If no requestkey
command is included in the configuration file, or if the keys don't
match, any request to change a server variable with be denied.
Specifies the key identifier to use with the ntpq program, which
uses the standard protocol defined in RFC-1305. This program is useful
to diagnose and repair problems that affect ntpd operation. The
key argument to this command is a 32-bit key identifier
for a trusted key in the key cache. If no controlkey command is
included in the configuration file, or if the keys don't match, any request
to change a server variable with be denied.
Authentication Key File Format
In the case of DES, the keys are 56 bits long with, depending on type,
a parity check on each byte. In the case of MD5, the keys are 64 bits (8
bytes). ntpd reads its keys from a file specified using the -k
command line option or the keys statement in the configuration
file. While key number 0 is fixed by the NTP standard (as 56 zero bits)
and may not be changed, one or more of the keys numbered 1 through 15 may
be arbitrarily set in the keys file.
The key file uses the same comment conventions as the configuration
file. Key entries use a fixed format of the form
keyno type key
where keyno is a positive integer, type
is a single character which defines the key format, and key
is the key itself.
The key may be given in one of three different formats, controlled by
the type character. The three key types, and corresponding
formats, are listed following.
The key is a 64-bit hexadecimal number in the format specified in the DES
specification; that is, the high order seven bits of each octet are used
to form the 56-bit key while the low order bit of each octet is given a
value such that odd parity is maintained for the octet. Leading zeroes
must be specified (i.e., the key must be exactly 16 hex digits long) and
odd parity must be maintained. Hence a zero key, in standard format, would
be given as 0101010101010101.
The key is a 64-bit hexadecimal number in the format specified in the NTP
standard. This is the same as the DES format, except the bits in each octet
have been rotated one bit right so that the parity bit is now the high
order bit of the octet. Leading zeroes must be specified and odd parity
must be maintained. A zero key in NTP format would be specified as 8080808080808080.
The key is a 1-to-8 character ASCII string. A key is formed from this by
using the low order 7 bits of each ASCII character in the string, with
zeroes added on the right when necessary to form a full width 56-bit key,
in the same way that encryption keys are formed from Unix passwords.
The key is a 1-to-8 character ASCII string, using the MD5 authentication
scheme. Note that both the keys and the authentication schemes (DES or
MD5) must be identical between a set of peers sharing the same key number.
Note that the keys used by the ntpq and ntpdc programs
are checked against passwords requested by the programs and entered by
hand, so it is generally appropriate to specify these keys in ASCII format.
David L. Mills (firstname.lastname@example.org)